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Predictive models have been used extensively to assess the likely effectiveness of vac-
cination policies as part of control measures in the event of a foot and mouth disease 
(FMD) outbreak. However, the availability of vaccine stocks and the impact of vaccine 
availability on disease control strategies represent a key uncertainty when assessing 
potential control strategies. Using an epidemiological, spatially explicit, simulation model 
in combination with a direct cost calculator, we assessed how vaccine availability con-
straints may affect the economic benefit of a “vaccination-to-live” strategy during a FMD 
outbreak in Scotland, when implemented alongside culling of infected premises and 
dangerous contacts. We investigated the impact of vaccine stock size and restocking 
delays on epidemiological and economic outcomes. We also assessed delays in the 
initial decision to vaccinate, maximum daily vaccination capacity, and vaccine efficacy. 
For scenarios with conditions conducive to large outbreaks, all vaccination strategies 
perform better than the strategy where only culling is implemented. A stock of 200,000 
doses, enough to vaccinate 12% of the Scottish cattle population, would be sufficient 
to maximize the relative benefits of vaccination, both epidemiologically and economi-
cally. However, this generates a wider variation in economic cost than if vaccination is 
not implemented, making outcomes harder to predict. The probability of direct costs 
exceeding £500 million is reduced when vaccination is used and is steadily reduced 
further as the size of initial vaccine stock increases. If only a suboptimal quantity of vac-
cine doses is initially available (100,000 doses), restocking delays of more than 2 weeks 
rapidly increase the cost of controlling outbreaks. Impacts of low vaccine availability or 
restocking delays are particularly aggravated by delays in the initial decision to vaccinate, 
or low vaccine efficacy. Our findings confirm that implementing an emergency vaccina-
tion-to-live strategy in addition to the conventional stamping out strategy is economically 
beneficial in scenarios with conditions conducive to large FMD outbreaks in Scotland. 
However, the size of the initial vaccine stock available at the start of the outbreak and 
the interplay with other factors, such as vaccine efficacy and delays in restocking or 
implementing vaccination, should be considered in making decisions about optimal 
control strategies for FMD outbreaks.
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1. inTrODUcTiOn
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) remains a constant threat to the 
livestock sector of the United Kingdom (UK). The 2001 FMD 
outbreak in the UK was one of the most costly livestock disease 
outbreaks reported, generating economic losses of over £8 billion 
(1), while a smaller outbreak in 2007 cost the British livestock 
sector £100 million and the government £47 million (2).
Current European and national disease control protocols 
mandate the culling of all susceptible animals on premises where 
FMD is identified (“infected premises,” IPs) and on those that 
have had epidemiological contact with IPs (“dangerous contacts,” 
DCs) to prevent disease spread, known as “stamping out.” The 
costs, logistics, and ethics of such a strategy, particularly for large 
outbreaks, are potentially challenging, however. For instance, 
in the 2001 FMD outbreaks in the UK, 6 million animals were 
slaughtered either due to infection or to limit the spread of the 
disease (1).
Given the challenges associated with a culling strategy, 
European legislation mandates consideration of vaccination in 
the event of an FMD outbreak. If vaccination was undertaken in 
Scotland, an emergency “vaccinate-to-live” policy would be used 
(i.e., vaccinated animals would not require routine culling after 
the outbreak), and would be carried out alongside conventional 
“stamping out” (in this paper referred to as a “cull plus vaccinate-
to-live” policy). The rationale of such a strategy is that, while 
IPs and DCs would still be depopulated, the local increase in 
immunity would reduce the spread of FMD, and hence reduce the 
overall number of animals to be culled. Although this approach is 
widely discussed, it has never been undertaken in the European 
Union (EU), and many questions still exist regarding its likely 
benefits.
Recent research to quantify the epidemiological effects of a 
“cull plus vaccinate-to-live” policy in Scotland found that, in gen-
eral, the net marginal benefit of such a policy was positive when 
facing widespread outbreaks, though this varied by regional 
context (3). While these results suggest an important role for 
vaccination in the case of large outbreaks, an important policy 
implication concerns the logistics of a vaccination policy itself. 
In the case of a large outbreak that affected Scotland and the 
rest of the UK (and possibly other parts of the EU), it remains 
an open question as to whether sufficient vaccine stocks and 
delivery capacity for such stocks could be mobilized adequately 
to arrest the spread of disease. Indeed, should a delay arise in the 
middle of a vaccination control campaign, it is not clear a priori 
how that might influence the progression of the outbreak as well 
as the potential direct costs associated with it. Should capacity 
constraints in vaccine delivery be significant, these delays could 
not only undermine the success of a vaccination campaign, but 
also impose significant costs on scarce veterinary resources.
These issues of capacity constraints have come up in other 
contexts. (4) and (5) highlighted the importance of vaccine capac-
ity in the context of bird flu. (6) looked at the impact of different 
FMD control strategies in the context of capacity to administer 
vaccination, as have other recent STUDIES on simulation 
approaches to the management of FMD vaccination strategies 
(7–9). However, no studies have specifically assessed the impact 
of the dynamics of vaccine stocks and their availability. Here, 
we focus in particular ON the impacts that vaccine stocks and 
vaccine delivery delays could have on the evolution and total cost 
of an outbreak, depending on when these constraints occur. In 
doing so, we provide improved information to decision makers 
on how to appropriately plan for contingencies associated with 
appropriate levels of vaccine stocks.
In this paper, we analyze the potential impact of vaccination 
constraints on simulated outbreaks of FMD in Scotland. We 
adapt the epidemiological model developed by Porphyre et  al. 
(3) to consider different scenarios of capacity constraints and 
their effects on disease evolution and direct costs. As such, we 
assess not only epidemiological impacts, but also the direct costs 
associated with the outbreak. Our aim is to provide insights to 
policymakers on the importance of logistical constraints in mak-
ing decisions on vaccination, including identifying any potential 
unintended consequences of adopting vaccination policies. We 
then suggest measures to help mitigate these challenges.
2. MaTerials anD MeThODs
2.1. Modeling Framework
The Warwick FMD model (6, 10–13) was used to simulate the 
various scenarios of vaccination. This model is a fully stochastic, 
spatial, farm-based model that was developed and used during 
the FMD epidemic in 2001 in Great Britain (10). It was later 
modified to represent the Scottish livestock industry (3). Either in 
its original formulation or in its Scottish version, this model has 
been extensively used to investigate the value of specific culling 
and vaccination strategies with respect to variations in epidemic 
conditions and control responses (3, 6, 11–13). We restricted our 
scenarios to FMD virus strains circulating within the cattle and 
sheep industries. As such, the model is restricted to all farms 
showing at least one animal susceptible to FMD (cattle or sheep). 
We assume that farms pass through four epidemiological states: 
susceptible; infected, but not infectious; infectious; or reported 
infected and thereby culled. The model assumes that each ith 
premises is infected with a daily probability depending on its own 
susceptibility Si and on the transmissibility Tj of the surrounding 
j premises. For the n premises involved in the study population, 
each ith premises has a daily probability Mi to be infected such that
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n
j ij= − −
≠
∑1 exp( ( ))
 
(1)
where Si and Tj depend on the species (i.e., cattle and sheep) and on 
the related herd size on premises (14, 15). The component K(dij) is 
the so-called “transmission kernel function” and determines the 
scaling factor on the rate at which infected premises may infect 
susceptible ones as a function of inter-farm distance dij.
In line with previous versions of the model (3, 6, 10, 11), we 
assumed that all farms are infected for 5 days before becoming 
infectious, and are infectious for 4  days before being reported 
with infection. The model further considers that once an initial 
infected premises (IP) is reported, a national movement ban 
(NMB) would be put in place. Culling measures on each IP would 
be implemented within 24 h. In addition to the routine culling 
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of IPs, premises where animals have been in direct contact with 
infected animals or have, in any way, become exposed to infec-
tion, known as dangerous contacts (DCs), are culled within 48 h. 
Premises defined as DCs are determined based upon both prior 
infection by an IP and future risk of infection (6). Although we 
assumed that the FMD virus strain involved in outbreaks would 
only circulate within the cattle and sheep industry, pig premises 
may still be subject to slaughter for disease control purposes (3, 
6). Once animals at an IP are slaughtered, disinfection procedures 
are initiated and no transmission events to other premises may 
occur. Preemptive culling based only on spatial proximity (known 
as “contiguous culling”) was not considered.
2.2. Vaccination and control scenarios
In line with the Scottish Government’s FMD contingency plan, if 
vaccination was to be implemented, we assumed that only cattle 
would be vaccinated (16) and that vaccinated animals would 
become immune to infection after 4 days. As in previous work (3, 
6), we make the conservative assumption that during this 4-day 
delay, all cattle are completely susceptible and if infected, the 
disease progresses in the same way as for non-vaccinated cattle. 
Unless otherwise stated, we considered that 90% of cattle present 
on vaccinated farms would become totally immune, while the 
rest would remain totally susceptible to infection and be able to 
transmit the virus to farms that were not vaccinated (6). Unless 
otherwise stated, we assumed that the vaccination campaign 
would start 14  days after the disease is first detected, allowing 
the decision to vaccinate to be taken, the doses of vaccine to 
be received from the appropriate vaccine bank and vaccination 
teams to be mobilized and actively deployed in the field. Once 
the decision to vaccinate has been made, vaccination would be 
implemented within a 10-km-radius buffer around each IP (16) 
and carried out within the recommended 24 h (17). Vaccination 
within each ring is performed from the outside in, which cor-
responds to standard policy (6).
Although the model assumes that a decision to vaccinate will 
be maintained throughout the outbreak (i.e., as disease spreads to 
new areas new vaccination zones will be created), the vaccination 
campaign would depend on the number of doses available. In the 
situation where the supply of vaccine is large enough, we assumed 
that the capacity to vaccinate would depend only on the level of 
human resources available. Here, we assumed that 50 vaccination 
teams would be mobilized (in line with Scottish Government 
plans), each of which can vaccinate up to 250 animals per day (18). 
This corresponds to a maximum of 12,500 animals vaccinated per 
day. In reality, the size of cattle herds in Scotland ranges from 1 
to 6,873 head (in 2011), with a median (interquartile range) of 92 
head of cattle (26–213 head). As such, it is unlikely that vaccinat-
ing 12,500 animals per day would be achieved, since vaccination 
teams can only travel to a limited number of cattle farms per day. 
Therefore, we assumed that, while the fixed daily vaccination 
capacity was 12,500 animals, a maximum of 125 farms could be 
vaccinated per day but also explored the impact of this parameter.
We considered a number of different scenarios associated 
with (i) the availability of vaccine stocks at the beginning of the 
outbreak and (ii) the capacity to re-order new stocks and the time 
delay required to obtain them. In the first case, we considered 
the evolution of FMD outbreaks under a vaccination strategy 
when the initial stock of vaccine varied between 100,000 and 5 
million doses, sufficient to vaccinate 6% to nearly 300% of the 
1.68 million head of cattle in Scotland. In the second case, we 
considered a scenario where an initial stock of 100,000 doses is 
available and explored the impacts of delays in obtaining new 
stocks ranging from 2 to 16 weeks. Should capacity constraints in 
the supply of vaccine be significant, vaccination would be carried 
out normally until no vaccine doses remain. In reality, however, 
disease control managers may order a new stock of vaccine from 
the appropriate vaccine bank when the level of the vaccine stock 
reaches a threshold. Here, a threshold of 10% and 50% remaining 
of the initial stock were considered. As delays in the production 
and delivery of the new supply of vaccine may occur, we further 
considered that vaccine would be only available several days 
after the date of the order. Unless otherwise stated, we assumed a 
restocking delay of 14 days.
There are also uncertainties with regards to the vaccine effi-
cacy, the delay in implementing vaccination and the maximum 
capacity of vaccinating cattle farms, which may impact on the 
benefit of re-ordering new stocks when a time delay to obtain 
them is introduced. We, therefore, evaluated the impact of 
these constraints in the role played by restocking delays on the 
evolution of an outbreak. We considered (i) a maximum vaccina-
tion capacity of 75, 100, 125, 150, or 165 farms per day, (ii) the 
implementation of the vaccination strategy at 7, 14, or 21 days 
post detection of the index case, and (iii) that vaccination confers 
70% or 90% immunity.
2.3. Model implementation
For all tested scenarios, 10,000 epidemics were simulated assum-
ing that FMD is introduced in a single susceptible herd and 
spread silently to four additional herds prior to detection. All 
initial infected herds are located in the county of Ayrshire, which 
has a high density of premises and animals, and has been previ-
ously identified as an area where there is potential for extensive 
initial spread, and hence a greater benefit from vaccination if 
an FMD outbreak occurred (3). For the purpose of this study, 
each simulation starts with the same set of initial infected herds. 
It is important to note that while the incursion events begin in 
Ayrshire, all herds present in mainland Scotland are susceptible 
to infection in the model.
2.4. Quantification of the Direct costs  
of an FMD Outbreak
We focused on the operational costs associated with an FMD out-
break occurring in Scotland and independently from the rest of 
Great Britain (GB). While Scotland is part of an epidemiological 
unit comprising GB and cross-border disease transmission would 
occur, management of animal health and disease control are fully 
devolved to the Scottish Government, meaning that disease con-
trol decisions are made independently by Scotland. Operational 
costs were defined as costs directly related to disease control 
activities and include, not only the cost of culling and vaccinat-
ing livestock, but also, among others, the cost of local movement 
restrictions and international trade bans. Taken together, the 
TaBle 1 | Breakdown of economic costs by group.
Disease control cost compensated 
cost
non-compensated 
cost
Government • Management cost
• Identifying IPs and DCs
• Depopulation
• Preliminary C&D
• Surveillance
• Vaccination
• Legal costs
• Welfare depopulation
• Disease control 
compensation
Industry • Loss of export 
market
• Abattoir losses
• Loss of animals 
culled for welfare 
reasons
• Withholding
• Secondary C&D
IPs, infected premises; DCs, dangerous contacts; C&D, cleaning and disinfection.
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operational costs considered in this study form the overall direct 
cost of controlling FMD outbreaks and was estimated in 2011 
equivalent pounds sterling. Wider economic costs, such as the 
impact on other rural businesses and tourism, were not consid-
ered in this analysis, and indirect costs of market reactions to an 
outbreak were not included. Table 1 details specific cost elements 
considered in the estimate of the direct cost, and whether they are 
incurred by the government (in this case Scottish Government) 
or by the livestock industry.
Briefly, the estimate of the direct cost of a given outbreak was 
directly calculated from outputs of the epidemiological model. In 
particular, the estimate of the direct cost depends on (i) the num-
bers of cattle, sheep, and pigs culled for disease control purposes, 
(ii) the number of premises defined as IPs and depopulated, (iii) 
the number of premises defined as DCs and depopulated, (iv) 
the duration (in days) of the outbreak, (v) the total number of 
doses used during the vaccination campaign (if implemented), 
as well as (vi) the numbers of farms and animals that have been 
vaccinated. All epidemiological outputs were then allocated to 
relevant specific cost elements and directly transformed into 
economic values based on current relevant international (i.e., 
from the World Organisation for Animal Health, OIE) and local 
legislations, control procedures, and guidelines when facing 
FMD outbreaks. In particular, international trade restrictions 
were assumed to last for 3  months following the last case in 
the absence of vaccination, and 6 months when vaccination is 
used, in line with current EU policy. Pricing information used 
to estimate each specific cost element was sourced from previ-
ously published data (19), adapted or updated where necessary. 
Discussions with policy makers in Scotland and UK govern-
ments and state veterinary organizations were undertaken in 
2012 to validate assumptions and ensure that any major changes 
in policy or strategy were reflected. Table S1 in Supplementary 
Material provides further details on the specific cost elements 
considered in the model and the assumptions related to each 
element.
3. resUlTs
The model results indicated that, for scenarios with conditions 
conducive to large outbreaks, and in the situation where the initial 
vaccine supply is limited and restocking is not available, all vac-
cination strategies were found to perform better than the strategy 
where only IP/DC is implemented (Figures 1 and 2; Figures S1–
S3 in Supplementary Material). However, a stock of 200,000 doses 
(i.e., 12% of all cattle in Scotland) would be sufficient to maximize 
the relative benefits of vaccination, both from an epidemiological 
and an economic standpoint (Figure 1A). Under such situation, 
completing a vaccination-to-live strategy alongside IP/DC culling 
would result in a median of 291,049 head of livestock (i.e., cattle, 
sheep, and pigs) culled (95% range 32,065–1.69 million) at a cost 
of £417 million (95% range £155–£1,455 million), affecting 490 
farms (95% range 84–1,941) and lasting for 139 days (95% range 
46–354 days). In comparison, implementing IP/DC alone would 
result in a median of 1.24 million head of livestock culled (95% 
range 78,500–2.02 million) at a cost of £862 million (95% range 
£169 million–£1,701 million) and a median outbreak duration of 
221 days (95% range 68–391 days).
At the same time, varying the size of the initial stock of 
vaccine impacts on the variability associated with the cost of 
controlling outbreaks (Figure 2). In particular, controlling epi-
demics through a vaccination strategy with a stock of 200,000 
(quartiles coefficient of dispersion QCD = 1.52) to 300,000 doses 
(QCD = 1.31) generates a wider variation in its economic cost 
than if vaccination is not implemented (QCD = 0.64). In other 
words, while the application of vaccination would be beneficial 
relative to no vaccination on average, we would have less certainty 
in the outcome. This result may be a source of concern; however, it 
is due to the vaccination strategy’s ability to progressively reduce 
the chance of outbreaks requiring large numbers of animals to be 
culled for disease control (Figure S3 in Supplementary Material).
The probability of direct costs exceeding £500 million, 
P(x > £500M), is reduced when vaccination is used, and stead-
ily reduces further as the size of initial vaccine stocks increases, 
before plateauing when initial vaccine stocks exceed 500,000 doses 
(i.e., 30% of all cattle in Scotland), regardless of delays (from 7 to 
21 days) in implementing the vaccine-to-live strategy in the field 
(Figure 1B). Looking at the probability that at least 95% of the 
initial vaccine stock is used to control the epidemics (Figure 1C), 
it is apparent that increasing the initial stock of vaccine would 
potentially leave large volumes of unused vaccine, even in the 
studied scenarios with conditions conducive to large outbreaks 
or when delays (from 7 to 21 days) occur in implementing vac-
cination in the field. For example, 95% of the vaccine stock is used 
65% of the time with an initial vaccine stock of 200,000 doses. In 
contrast, when the stock exceeds 1 million doses (i.e., covering 
60% of all cattle in Scotland), 95% of the vaccine stock is used 
0% of the time.
Although the cost borne by the industry is six times greater 
(median: 6.02, 95% range: 2.95–9.90) than the cost incurred by 
the government in all vaccination scenarios, increasing the size of 
the vaccine stock at the start of the epidemic would be beneficial 
for both industry and government (Figure 1D). Figure 3A and 
Figure S4 in Supplementary Material illustrate the distribution of 
FigUre 1 | Changes in epidemic and economic outcomes when vaccination is implemented, or not, under conditions conducive to large outbreaks. Changes in  
(a) the median estimates of various epidemic outcomes under various vaccine stocks; (B) the probability of the direct cost exceeding £500million, P(x > £500M), 
depending on days between detection and vaccination; (c) the probability of using more than 95% of the initial vaccine stock; and (D) the median direct economic 
costs incurred by each sector when vaccination is not implemented, or implemented 14 days after detection assuming an initial vaccine stock that varies between 
100,000 and 5 million doses. Epidemic outcomes shown in (a) are number of infected premises (“IPs”), duration of the outbreaks in days (“duration”), number of 
infected premises and premises identified as dangerous contacts (“IPs + DCs”), and the total direct costs of the outbreak in £millions (“cost”). Shown in panels  
(B) and (c) are changes in P(x > £500M) and P(x > 0.95xstock) when vaccination is implemented for 7, 14, and 21 days after the detection of the index cases, 
respectively.
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economic value, and relative contribution to the total estimates, of 
each specific cost element under different scenarios of initial vac-
cine stocks. In the situation where initial stock is 200,000 doses, 
the loss of export market, national movement ban (and its effects 
on reduced value of animals and increased welfare losses), and 
livestock culled due to disease control dominate the direct costs of 
a widespread FMD outbreak in Scotland (Figure 3A), accounting 
for 38% (95% range: 17–70%), 45% (95% range: 18–68%), and 
9% (95% range: 3–21%) of the total cost, respectively (Figure S4 
in Supplementary Material). For comparison, the contribution of 
the loss of export market, movement ban, and livestock culled in 
overall direct cost of a widespread FMD outbreak in Scotland are 
17% (95% range: 12–47%), 56% (95% range: 34–70%), and 17% 
(95% range: 7–27%), respectively, when implementing IP/DC 
alone. However, increasing the initial vaccine stock size decreases 
the costs associated with culling and with movement restrictions 
(Figure  3A; Figure S4A in Supplementary Material), notably 
due to reduced duration and number of IPs (Figures S1 and S2 
in Supplementary Material). In contrast, increasing the initial 
vaccine stock size does not impact significantly on the losses of 
the export market (Figure  3A; Figure S4A in Supplementary 
Material). However, it increases the importance of the loss of the 
export market in the total direct costs of the outbreak, accounting 
on average for nearly half of the total direct cost (Figure S4B in 
Supplementary Material).
When investigating the impact of different lengths of restock-
ing delays, we considered that only a relatively small vaccine stock 
of 100,000 doses (i.e., covering 6% of all cattle in Scotland) would 
be initially available to control the outbreak. Figure 4 shows the 
epidemiological and economic consequences when increasing 
the length of time required to receive new vaccine stocks, and 
highlights that large restocking delays are of particular impor-
tance. In particular, delays of >2 weeks rapidly increase the size 
and duration of the outbreaks (Figure 4A; Figures S5 and S6 in 
Supplementary Material) and increase the direct costs of control 
from £365 million (95% range: £151–£1,051 million) to £588 mil-
lion (95% range: £151–£1,205 million, Figure 4A; Figure S7 in 
Supplementary Material). Looking at the risk of outbreaks costing 
FigUre 3 | Contribution of each specific cost elements to the total direct economic cost when controlling large FMD outbreaks in Scotland. Median cost estimates 
(in £ million) of each specific cost element for (a) increasing initial vaccine stocks from 100,000 to 5 million doses, and (B) increasing delays in restocking vaccines, 
from 2 to 16 weeks, when initial vaccine stock was limited to 100,000 doses. Here, vaccination was implemented 14 days after detection of FMD in Scotland. If new 
stocks of vaccine doses have been ordered (B), restocking demand has been triggered when less than 10% of the initial vaccine stock remains. Considered cost 
elements are those related to (i) the cleaning and disinfection (C&D) of depopulated farms (including preliminary and secondary C&D), (ii) the depopulation of farms 
(including compensation and legal costs), (iii) the loss of export trade, (iv) managing disease control activities, (v) the implementation of surveillance activities during 
and post outbreak, (vi) the implementation of the vaccination-to-live strategy and the reduction in value of vaccinated animals, (vii) the implementation of a national 
movement ban (including the loss of trade and the reduction in value of withheld animals, losses due to the reduction of throughputs in Scottish abattoirs, and the 
worsening of animal welfare standard).
FigUre 2 | Distribution of the direct economic cost (in £ million) when cattle are vaccinated or not vaccinated, assuming conditions conducive to large outbreaks. 
Each panel shows these distributions when the size of the vaccine stock at the start of the epidemic is (a) 0.1, (B) 0.2, (c) 0.3, (D) 0.5, (e) 1, and  
(F) 5 million doses. Solid vertical lines represent the median direct economic costs in each scenario.
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over £500 million (Figure 4B), delays in restocking vaccine doses 
from 2 to 16 weeks substantially increased P(x > £500M) from 
0.329 (95% C.I. 0.320–0.338) to 0.552 (95% C.I. 0.542–0.562). 
This general trend is not disproportionately affected by delays 
in the decision to vaccinate, though a late decision to vaccinate 
would ultimately further increase the risk of expensive outbreaks 
(Figure  4B). It is, however, worth noting that in  situations in 
which the vaccination strategy decision is taken late (i.e., 21 days 
FigUre 4 | Impact of restocking delays on the epidemic and economic outcomes when implementing a vaccination strategy under conditions conducive to large 
outbreaks. Changes in (a) the median estimates of various epidemic outcomes, and (B) the probability of the direct cost exceeding £500million, P(x > £500M), are 
shown for scenarios which either do not allow a restocking strategy or allow a restocking strategy with increasing delays, from 2 to 16 weeks. Here, initial vaccine 
stock was limited to 100,000 doses. Solid and dashed lines represent the changes in outcomes when restocking demand is triggered when less than 10% and 50% 
of the vaccine stock remains, respectively.
FigUre 5 | Impact of restocking delays on economic outcomes when implementing imperfect vaccination strategies and under conditions conducive to large 
outbreaks. Changes of the probability of the direct cost exceeding £500million, P(x > £500M), are shown for varying (a) the maximum daily capacity of vaccination 
teams to vaccinate farms and (B) the vaccine efficacy in generating an immune response to cattle. Solid and dashed lines represent the changes in outcomes when 
restocking demand is triggered when less than 10% and 50% of the vaccine stock remains, respectively.
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after detection) with a suboptimal initial vaccine stock, the risk of 
expensive outbreaks when large (i.e., 12 weeks) restocking delays 
occur (P(x > £500M) = 0.593, 95% C.I. 0.583–0.603) would be 
the same as if no restocking occurred (P(x > £500M) = 0.602, 
95% C.I. 0.592–0.612), while the median direct cost would be 
£30.6 million less (i.e., a saving of only 4.4%).
Restocking delays are particularly felt by the government, 
nearly doubling its average expenses from £50.4 to £96.6 million. 
This increase is due to the government facing higher disease 
control costs and greater demands for welfare depopulation 
(Figure S8 in Supplementary Material). However, the industry 
still bear most of the costs, which increase by 45% if restocking 
delays increase from 2 to 16 weeks. These increases in costs result 
from the national movement ban being enforced for a longer 
period of time, causing large welfare losses of animals, and high 
withholding costs incurred by individual farmers (Figure  3B; 
Figure S8A in Supplementary Material). By contrast, the increase 
in loss from reduced exports is relatively small (Figure 3B; Figure 
S8A in Supplementary Material) and, as a consequence, its contri-
bution to the total direct cost progressively decreases (Figure S8B 
in Supplementary Material).
Finally, we investigated the impact of various operational 
constraints that may affect the economic outcome of a vaccina-
tion strategy with increasing restocking delays: the threshold at 
which new vaccine stock is ordered, the efficacy of the vaccine, 
and the maximum daily capacity (in number of vaccinated 
farms) of vaccination teams. Varying the threshold at which 
new vaccine stock is ordered from 10 to 50% remaining of the 
initial stock shows little impact on the risk of very costly out-
breaks P(x > £500M) (Figures 4B and 5) or on epidemiological 
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outcomes (Figures S5 and S6 in Supplementary Material). These 
results indicate that the point at which new stock is ordered has 
less impact than the delays in restocking, presumably because 
the number of days saved by ordering earlier would be minimal 
in comparison to the length of time taken to restock. Similarly, 
varying the maximum number of farms vaccinated per day 
from 75 to 165 does not mitigate the impact of restocking delays 
(Figure 5A). In contrast, quick restocking may offset, at least 
partly, economic losses due to poor vaccine efficacy. Indeed, for 
a vaccine with 70% efficacy, restocking within 2 weeks would 
reduce P(x >  £500M) to a similar level as when using a vac-
cine with 90% efficacy, but with restocking delays exceeding 
12 weeks (Figure 5B).
4. DiscUssiOn
Predictive models have been extensively used worldwide to assess 
the likely effectiveness of possible vaccination measures in the 
event of an FMD outbreak (3, 6, 8, 11, 17, 20–25). With such mod-
els, several operational aspects of an FMD vaccination strategy 
are now better defined. For instance, the choice of implementing a 
vaccination strategy ultimately depends upon the early infection 
profile and the perceived likelihood of a large-scale epidemic (3, 
26). However, the use of vaccination during an FMD outbreak 
remains limited by uncertainties regarding the availability of 
vaccine stocks and their dynamics, particularly with regards to 
their impact on the final economic cost for government versus 
industry. Here, we have explored how capacity constraints may 
affect the cost-efficiency of a vaccination-to-live strategy during 
an FMD outbreak in Scotland.
Our results show that, for scenarios with conditions conducive 
to large outbreaks, all vaccination strategies were economically 
beneficial compared to a strategy where only culling of infected 
premises and dangerous contacts was implemented. These results 
not only reaffirm findings from studies in Europe and elsewhere 
that vaccinating animals to support culling strategies can be 
beneficial epidemiologically (3, 23, 27), but also indicate that 
these strategies can be economically beneficial when controlling 
widespread epidemics.
Even when vaccination is used, there is still a risk of very 
costly outbreaks in Scotland (i.e., >£500 million). This risk is 
most reduced when an initial stock of at least 500,000 doses, 
sufficient to vaccinate 30% of all cattle in Scotland, is available 
as soon as FMD is detected. The costs saved when 500,000 doses 
are available are mostly due to reduced depopulation activi-
ties and shorter duration of movement restrictions (Figure  3; 
Figure S4 in Supplementary Material). On the other hand, costs 
associated with the loss of the export market remain unaffected, 
becoming the most substantial relative cost (>45%; Figure S4 in 
Supplementary Material) as other costs reduce. Even though the 
loss of the export market is important, it is not critical enough to 
affect the relative benefits of using vaccination to control large 
epidemics in Scotland. This is mostly because commodities sub-
ject to international restrictions during FMD outbreaks represent 
a relatively small proportion of Scotland’s GDP compared to 
other countries. In contrast, for export-focused countries, such as 
Denmark, vaccinate-to-live strategies are not cost-effective (28). 
This is particularly due to current regulations restricting exports 
for 6  months before regaining free status when vaccination is 
used, rather than 3 months when only “stamping out” is used. The 
necessity of these restrictions has been questioned (29); clearly 
any changes to this policy could have significant impacts on the 
cost-effectiveness of vaccination strategies.
While a risk-averse policymaker might focus on minimizing 
the risk of a very costly outbreak (by stocking at least 500,000 
doses), we have shown that a stock of 200,000 doses (i.e., covering 
12% of all cattle in Scotland) would be sufficient to maximize the 
relative benefits of vaccination, both from an epidemiological and 
an economic standpoint, and to minimize losses due to vaccine 
stock wastage (Figure 1). In the case that sufficient vaccine is not 
immediately available, restocking is an option to optimize vac-
cination benefits. However, constraints in sourcing and shipping 
new stocks may create delays. Here, we have shown that delays in 
restocking would increase the cost and duration of an outbreak. 
Notably, delays of more than 56 days not only increase the size, 
duration, and direct economic cost of the FMD outbreak at hand, 
but also increase the risk of the direct economic costs exceeding 
£500 million. The effects of vaccine restocking delays on outbreak 
duration drive a relative increase in costs associated with move-
ment restrictions, while the increased number of IPs increases the 
costs associated with culling for disease control. This suggests that 
if only small initial stocks are available, vaccination should still be 
implemented, but the availability and ability to draw from exist-
ing FMD VACCINE stocks, whether in Scotland, in the rest of UK 
or overseas, must be considered to ensure delays are minimized.
In reality, the batch size and cost of vaccine purchases would 
likely be subject to individual negotiation, availability of appro-
priate antigen strains, and concurrent FMD vaccine requirements 
in other countries. Our results highlight that priorities regarding 
vaccine access are (i) the number of vaccine doses available at 
the start of an outbreak and (ii) the speed of restocking. In addi-
tion, the interplay with vaccine efficacy and delays in the field 
implementation of the vaccination strategy is important. Delays 
in vaccine restocking become particularly important when 
facing an outbreak of a serotype where low vaccine efficacy is 
a concern. Therefore, vaccine availability and efficacy should be 
considered together when deciding whether vaccination should 
be implemented.
In a previous study, we showed that delays in implementing 
vaccination reduce its epidemiological benefit (3). In this study, 
we found that implementing vaccination at 21 days compared to 
7 or 14 days increased the risk of very costly outbreaks, regard-
less of the size of vaccine stock available. Given the time needed 
to source vaccine and initiate implementation, some delays are 
difficult to avoid. Vaccination is usually beneficial only in large 
outbreaks (3). This study considered only scenarios where condi-
tions conducive to large outbreaks, hence vaccination was likely 
to be beneficial. In reality, decisions about whether to vaccinate or 
not have to be made based on only the initial epidemiological pic-
ture in order to minimize the delay. The first fortnight incidence 
(30) and first 14 days of spatial spread (24) have been described 
as indicators of the likely size and duration of an epidemic, which 
can be used to make a decision about whether to implement vac-
cination. Our results show that there is little difference between 
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implementing vaccination at 7 days compared to 14 days, regard-
less of the vaccine stock available, confirming that taking 14 days 
to assess the epidemiological picture before making a decision 
about vaccination would not significantly affect the benefits.
In the scenarios we looked at, which predisposed for large 
outbreaks, the livestock industry always bore more than double 
the costs of the government. However, this relative cost burden 
to industry increased to four times that of government when vac-
cination was used. In previous FMD outbreaks, the Scottish/UK 
Governments were eligible for rebates from EU for some aspects 
of disease control and compensation costs (19). Given the uncer-
tainty over Scotland’s future relationship with EU, this rebate was 
excluded from our analyses. If any rebate was available, however, 
this would have reduced costs borne by the Scottish government 
alone. Our findings that the industry would bear a substantial 
majority of costs are in contrast to some previous findings, that 
in a large outbreak in GB, over half the costs sit with government 
(19), but in line with the relative distributions described by other 
authors (31, 32).
In our model, the costs to the industry are particularly 
driven by the effects of movement restrictions and the impact of 
export bans. Movement licenses are issued during an outbreak 
to allow specific movements to occur, particularly movements 
to slaughter, to limit the negative economic and animal welfare 
consequences. For simplicity, we assumed that all animals 
intended for slaughter were kept for 30 days before licenses were 
issued or until the outbreak ended, whichever occurred first. 
We made such an assumption in line with current policy, but in 
reality movement restrictions and licensed moves are more fluid 
and responsive as they depend on both the epidemiological and 
political context at the time. Notably, licenses can be issued in 
a phased approach, with for example movement of animals to 
slaughter licensed for specific geographical areas at least 8 days 
after the most recent IP (33). However, when looking in more 
detail at the number of animals subject to movement restrictions, 
less than 20% were intended for slaughter (18.7%, 95% range 
10.4–38.7%) and, therefore, eligible to be moved under license 
to slaughter. Hence, although we may have overestimated losses 
due to movement restrictions, such a bias should be limited and 
should not significantly affect our overall results.
In our economic model, we assumed that animals and 
products that could not be exported would be slaughtered and 
consumed within the domestic market, incurring a loss in value. 
This contributes to the larger proportion of costs borne by indus-
try when vaccination is used, since vaccination incurs a 6-month 
trade restriction. It is difficult to predict how markets would 
behave in an outbreak situation where vaccination is used. An 
assessment of the effect on markets and impacts on related direct 
costs (such as tourism or other rural industries) are, therefore, 
important, but beyond the remit of this study. Other authors have 
assumed that trade with other EU countries could continue from 
non-affected regions, if regional approaches were permitted (28, 
31). In the model, we ignored the potential impact of applying the 
principle of regionalization (as defined by EU Council Directive 
2003/85/EC) on within-EU trade when emergency vaccination is 
conducted, meaning that all trade with other EU members was 
assumed to not be possible. However, if some trade were possible, 
the cost of trade restrictions would be reduced, further increasing 
the economic benefit of implementing emergency vaccination to 
control FMD (28).
In this study, we assumed that an initial supply of vaccine 
would be available shortly after FMD is declared in Scotland, 
regardless of the strain and serotype of the virus involved in the 
outbreak. Quick access to vaccine can be achieved by calling 
upon national or international bank(s) of fully formulated FMD 
vaccines and/or FMD antigen (34, 35). The UK decision to leave 
the EU (known as “Brexit”) has introduced uncertainty regard-
ing the ability of the UK to access European and international 
vaccine banks (36). Opportunity costs associated with formulat-
ing, maintaining, or purchasing vaccine stock were not included 
in our model, but could be significant (37). Whether these 
costs would offset or not the economic benefit of an emergency 
vaccinate-to-live strategy is unclear and, therefore, needs to be 
considered in the future.
Our results have implications for making robust decisions on 
how best to control FMD in Scotland. When comparing potential 
FMD control strategies, metrics used to assess outcomes are 
important. Different metrics give different optimal strategies (38) 
and in reality reflect the priorities of different stakeholders (31). 
Here, we chose to estimate the full economic cost of activities 
when controlling a FMD outbreak. While calculating all direct 
costs is time-consuming, it is more likely to reflect the reality of 
the range and interplay of impacts than simply using epidemio-
logical outcomes (such as the number of IPs, or duration of the 
outbreak (3)), or simplified indicator costs (25, 31, 38). This is 
particularly relevant when it comes to incorporating factors, such 
as trade bans. For example, a recent study from Denmark high-
lighted that emergency vaccination was never cost-effective due 
to impacts on the substantial Danish export market, despite being 
epidemiologically effective (28). In addition, measures assessing 
cost-effectiveness are often required for policy makers to make 
decisions; thus, it is helpful to present a range of outcomes (epide-
miological and economic) to demonstrate the issue’s complexity 
to policy makers.
In conclusion, our findings confirm that an emergency 
vaccination-to-live strategy, in addition to the conventional 
stamping out strategy, is economically beneficial in  situations 
conducive to large outbreaks in Scotland. However, the size of the 
initial vaccine stock available at the start of the outbreak, and the 
interplay with other factors, such as vaccine efficacy and delays 
in implementing or restocking vaccination, should be considered 
in making decisions about optimal control strategies for FMD 
outbreaks.
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